One of the components of the new FAA fatigue ruling concerns fitness for duty.
This component is listed below:
“Fitness for duty. The FAA expects pilots and airlines to take joint responsibility when considering if a pilot is fit for duty, including fatigue resulting from pre-duty activities such as commuting. At the beginning of each flight segment, a pilot is required to affirmatively state his or her fitness for duty. If a pilot reports he or she is fatigued and unfit for duty, the airline must remove that pilot from duty immediately.”
Under the ruling a pilot is now legally responsible to ensure his/her fitness for flight duty. If the pilot is not fit for duty, they are required to remove themselves from duty for the safety of the flight.
There could be a myriad of reasons that a pilot may not be fit for duty (fatigued) for a flight. Examples include lack of sleep at a noisy airport layover hotel and loud guests that keep others awake but the most often cited reason for fatigue is long duty periods under stressful situations and adverse weather. During adverse weather situations, a pilot’s duty day is often extended in excess of 12 hours while they have to deal with increased workloads as a result of snow, thunderstorms or other weather events. With the combination of increased hours and increased mental fatigue as a result of the extra concerns a pilot has to deal with, many pilots often becomes fatigued. The harsh and potentially lethal reality is that fatigue, often unrecognized can result in clouded judgment, an unacceptable combination for someone flying an airplane.
In the wake of the Buffalo Colgan Air accident, the government has taken years to develop rules in an attempt to protect the traveling public from another pilot fatigue accident. The ruling has been out less than two months and AMR management is already trying to place punitive language in their pilots’ contract that could influence pilots not to call in fatigued.
Management’s proposal to “delete guarantee protection for reserves,” appears financially punitive for reserve pilots. While the details have yet to be explained, it appears the proposal would reduce a reserve pilot’s pay if he or she calls in fatigued for duty. So now a pilot has to pick between losing pay by calling in fatigued or flying fatigued to receive their compensation. Management understands that given the major financial impact of their 1113 proposals on pilots’ pay, most pilots will be forced to fly fatigued rather than accept further pay reductions. Is this form of “pilot productivity” in the public interest?
Is management’s 1113 proposal really trying to manage a fatigue policy or have they designed a financially punitive proposal that forces a pilot to make the wrong decision?
“Fitness for duty. The FAA expects pilots and airlines to take joint responsibility when considering if a pilot is fit for duty, including fatigue resulting from pre-duty activities such as commuting. At the beginning of each flight segment, a pilot is required to affirmatively state his or her fitness for duty. If a pilot reports he or she is fatigued and unfit for duty, the airline must remove that pilot from duty immediately.”
Under the ruling a pilot is now legally responsible to ensure his/her fitness for flight duty. If the pilot is not fit for duty, they are required to remove themselves from duty for the safety of the flight.
There could be a myriad of reasons that a pilot may not be fit for duty (fatigued) for a flight. Examples include lack of sleep at a noisy airport layover hotel and loud guests that keep others awake but the most often cited reason for fatigue is long duty periods under stressful situations and adverse weather. During adverse weather situations, a pilot’s duty day is often extended in excess of 12 hours while they have to deal with increased workloads as a result of snow, thunderstorms or other weather events. With the combination of increased hours and increased mental fatigue as a result of the extra concerns a pilot has to deal with, many pilots often becomes fatigued. The harsh and potentially lethal reality is that fatigue, often unrecognized can result in clouded judgment, an unacceptable combination for someone flying an airplane.
In the wake of the Buffalo Colgan Air accident, the government has taken years to develop rules in an attempt to protect the traveling public from another pilot fatigue accident. The ruling has been out less than two months and AMR management is already trying to place punitive language in their pilots’ contract that could influence pilots not to call in fatigued.
Management’s proposal to “delete guarantee protection for reserves,” appears financially punitive for reserve pilots. While the details have yet to be explained, it appears the proposal would reduce a reserve pilot’s pay if he or she calls in fatigued for duty. So now a pilot has to pick between losing pay by calling in fatigued or flying fatigued to receive their compensation. Management understands that given the major financial impact of their 1113 proposals on pilots’ pay, most pilots will be forced to fly fatigued rather than accept further pay reductions. Is this form of “pilot productivity” in the public interest?
Is management’s 1113 proposal really trying to manage a fatigue policy or have they designed a financially punitive proposal that forces a pilot to make the wrong decision?
