Saturday, February 11, 2012

Pay Banding...Training Cost Savings or Hidden Agenda?

The following is the first in a series of two articles illustrating significant issues with management’s pay banding proposal. Although the details discussed can get quickly technical, there are some serious negative long-term effects that readers are urged to read and re-read as necessary to properly grasp.

For years, management has expressed their desire to group similar sized aircraft for the purposes of pay. Management has stated by doing so American would save training costs because fewer pilots would transition between aircraft since there were fewer aircraft pay differentials.  But is this actually the basis of management’s 1113 aircraft grouping proposal?

Unlike what our competitors have done with aircraft equipment grouping, management’s proposal does NOT accomplish the legitimate objective of reducing training costs. Instead, it represents significant pilot pay cuts...

Other carriers have grouped aircraft for the purpose of pay for years, but for an entirely different purpose than what AMR management is trying to craft with their 1113 proposal. 

UPS has one pay rate for all aircraft, FedEx has two pay groups and Continental has three.  Obviously, the fewer aircraft pay groups, the less likely pilots will be to transition between different sized aircraft. Since UPS has only one pay rate, its pilots have the least financial incentive of all carriers’ pilots to transition between aircraft. As more groups are added, more training events will occur as pilots seek greater pay rates with each higher paying group. Therefore, it is logical that FedEx’s training costs would be higher than UPS’ and Continental’s higher than FedEx’s.

If UPS’ pay grouping results in just one less aircraft transition for each pilot over their career and each training cycle cost UPS $60,000 in pilot, instructor, and check airman wages, simulator time and maintenance, hotel, travel and per diem costs then with 2,600 pilots at UPS, UPS would save $156,000,000 over an average pilot’s career of approximately 30 years or $5,200,000 a year.

So why does FedEx have two groupings when UPS only has one? Because at some point the pay differential that can be achieved by paying a lower pay rate for a lower paying grouping outweighs the potential in cost savings of fewer training cycles. FedEx management most likely determined that the cost of paying 727 and 757 aircraft at the higher pay grouping would cost more than the cost of additional training cycles that would occur by grouping them separately.

It is important to note that for the purposes of cost savings on training cycles it makes no difference that UPS and FedEX are cargo carriers. The same principle applies for both cargo and passenger carriers.  

American Airlines operates four bid statuses, the MD80, 737, 757/767 and 777.  Because of the current differentials in pay rates between each aircraft, pilots are more inclined to bid a larger aircraft that pays more when their seniority allows it.

Under management’s 1113 proposal they propose six groups to cover aircraft sized from greater than 88 seats to aircraft the size of an Airbus 380. Under their scope proposal, aircraft with 88 seats or less would be flown by commuter carriers.

Beginning next year American Airlines will begin receiving the Airbus 319 and 321 aircraft and the Boeing 787 the following year. Following the delivery of these aircraft American will operate aircraft in four different pay groups under their 1113 proposal, the same number of bid status’ we operate today.  So, if management’s real goal was to reduce a pilot’s financial motivation to change aircraft their proposal was not crafted properly.

Under our current system, after the retirement of the MD80s and the delivery of the A319/A321’s and the 787’s, American would operate four bid statuses, the 737, A319/A321, 757/767 and 787/777, the same number of bid statuses we have today and the same number of pay groupings under management’s 1113 proposal. There is no logical argument for management’s proposal, if they are honestly pursing a pay structure to reduce training costs by the virtue of reducing separate pay groups.  If reducing training costs was their intent, they would have constructed a pay grouping proposal that pays the same pay rate for common typed aircraft, like every other major carrier has done.

Management’s A320 family pay proposals are VERY different than those at our competition...

There are several carriers that operate different derivatives of the A320 family, including both the A319 and the A321.  Delta operates the A320/A319, United the A320/A319, USAIR the A321/A320/A319, Spirit the A321/A320/A319 and Frontier the A320/A319/A318.  Every one of these carriers pays one pay rate for all derivatives of the Airbus aircraft since they are a common type rating. Every operator of the A319 pays the same rate as their A321/A320, unlike management’s proposal which proposes to pay a lower--much lower--pay rate for the A319.

Under management’s proposal the A319 will be grouped in a lower paying equipment grouping than the A321.  Once again. management has crafted a proposal contrary to their publicly stated intentions.  Grouping the A319 in a lower paying grouping does nothing to reduce training cycles.  Their proposal is designed to do one thing, lower pay rates under the misleading public statement that their proposal is being done to reduce training costs. 

If the APA were to agree to management’s equipment grouping proposal, management would achieve a pay structure that no other carrier has implemented, a lower pay rate for their A319 than the A321. 

Furthermore, management has not decided how the A319 and the A321 will be operated.  Will they be operated in separate bid status’ or the same bid status?

...Resulting in an approximate 20% pay cut

Without knowing how the A321 and A319 will be operated it is foreseeable that a pilot who bids the Airbus thinking he will paid according to the Group III pay rate of the A321 may actually end up flying the Group II A319 because of equipment substitutions or even the simple fact the A321 is not allocated to that pilot’s base.  This potential scenario could result in a 20% pay reduction to a pilot’s pay rate by substituting a Group II A319 for a Group III A321.

The only way to prevent management from unilaterally implementing additional pay cuts on pilots who bid to fly the A321 is to operate the A319 in a completely different bid status from the A321.

If management were to operate the A319 and A321 in different bid status’ and pay them based on different pay groupings, training costs would increase--not decrease--as pilots would bid higher paying grouped aircraft like the 737 or 757, no different than today.  The additional costs to operate separate bid statuses would also increase costs above that of operating a common bid status.  These are the very reasons every other pilot group and ultimately their management agreed to a single pay rate and common bid status for the Airbus family of aircraft.

Part 2 of this series will further focus on the significant hidden pay cuts management has cloaked in the details of their equipment grouping proposal.